

on the Russian military stepped up, in parallel, until the outbreak of full-scale combat.

The most serious fighting since 1996 occurred after Wahhabite forces from Chechnya seized villages in Dagestan. Maskhadov himself charged that the Wahhabites were financed from abroad for the purpose of destroying the North Caucasus, as well as Russia. He was seconded by Ingushetian President Gen. Ruslan Aushev, who told *Moskovskie Novosti* on Aug. 24, "It is not a secret that the bandits [in Dagestan] are financed by rival forces which are trying to change the route of the Caspian oil pipeline."

From Jan. 1, 1999 through June, more than 100 people, mostly troops and police manning border posts, through to June, were killed in raids by Chechnya-based guerrillas. There were raids against both Interior Ministry and regular Army forces serving in the area. The ouster of Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov, who had pursued a diplomatic and economic-reconstruction approach to stabilizing Moscow's relations with Maskhadov, gave the green light for a sharper escalation of the conflict, which had begun to explode in March of this year.

From March onward, there were higher death tolls and new, high-ranking kidnap victims. In March, Interior Ministry Gen. Maj. Gennadi Shpigun was kidnapped in Grozny, a crime attributed in the Russian media to Chechen Commander Barayev, "Salman Raduyev," or, for Byzantine motives of Russian politics, Boris Berezovsky.

A number of Russian strategists became convinced that "after the Balkans, the Caucasus is next." While the world's attention was fixed on Kosovo, Russia began to build up troops near the borders of Chechnya. Between March and the end of June, at least 17,000 Russian Interior Troops were brought into position, while Prime Minister (for that moment) Sergei Stepashin's successor as Interior Minister, Vladimir Rushailo, said the force might be increased to 70,000. In the latter half of June, these troops were buttressed with heavy artillery units.

On July 3, Rushailo had told the Russian Federation Council that he was prepared to order preemptive attacks against Chechen terrorists engaged in kidnappings, assassinations, and other actions aimed at destabilizing the border region. "We are talking about [securing] territories along the administrative border [with Chechnya]. It will be a local operation linked to attacks on our border posts and checkpoints." On July 5, for the first time since 1996, Russian military units carried out an attack against Chechen rebels, along the Dagestan regional border. The July 5 military operation by the Russian Army involved helicopters and mortar fire, targeting a group of several hundred Chechens.

The invasion of Dagestan by Wahhabite guerrillas from Chechnya, in August, has been covered by *EIR* over recent weeks. Russian combined ground-air operations drove them out, whereupon Basayev threatened to hit Russia with new acts of terrorism, "such as the world has not seen."

The neo-Ottoman trap for Turkey

by Joseph Brewda

The 1989-91 collapse of the Soviet Union presented itself as both a strategic threat and an opportunity to NATO member Turkey, which had fought six wars with Russia since the beginning of the nineteenth century, including World War I, which destroyed both the Ottoman (Turkish) and Russian empires. An opportunity, because it would seem that Turkey's major military antagonist was destroyed; a threat, since the question was posed as to what would happen to the Soviet Union's Caucasian fragments.

Because the Caucasus region is mostly Islamic in faith, has a large Turkic minority, and was once Ottoman-ruled or dominated, Zbigniew Brzezinski and other Anglo-American geopoliticians have argued that Turkey now has an historic chance to reassert its dominance, or at least extend its defense perimeter into the region, through promoting Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ideologies. Brzezinski and his cronies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University say that Azerbaijan's oil deposits could make Turkey rich. They add that making the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan the terminus of oil and natural gas pipelines from the region, would also consolidate its political influence.

On the other hand, it is clear that the spreading anti-Russian Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic movements in the Caucasus could also boomerang back into Turkey itself, thereby undermining the Turkish Republic which Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had formed in the 1920s after crushing both movements. By being lured into reviving such Ottoman imperial methods of ethnic and religious manipulation in the Caucasus, Turkey itself, it would seem, could become its prime victim. The spreading NATO-run wars in the Caucasus—Armenia vs. Azerbaijan, the Abkhazian revolt in Georgia, the revolts in Chechnya, and now Dagestan—have pushed to the fore the question as to what path Turkey should follow.

The Bernard Lewis network

The senior British case officer for the neo-Ottoman revival in Turkey, and the region, is retired Prof. Bernard Lewis, a career British intelligence official originally ensconced at the London School of Oriental and African Studies (formerly the School of Colonial Studies), who transferred to Princeton University in New Jersey, where he is now a professor emeritus. Lewis's writings, such as *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, published in 1960, have functioned as encouragement

BOZKURT



The cover of *Bozkurt*, a World War II Pan-Turk journal, showing the projected Pan-Turkic homeland. The “bozkurt”—the gray, steppe wolf—displayed next to the map, is the Pan-Turk symbol.

for Turkey to step forward as a regional superpower, in conflict with Russia. The fall of communism has not changed this policy. In January 1996, for instance, Lewis insisted to a bankers’ conference in Ankara, Turkey, that there is a “vacuum in the region which Turkey should and must fill.”

Spelling out his strategy in a 1992 article in the New York Council on Foreign Relations magazine *Foreign Affairs*, Lewis emphasized that “Lebanonization” would soon destroy the former Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia. “If the central power is sufficiently weakened,” he said of former Soviet Central Asia, “there is no real civil society to hold the polity together, no real sense of common national identity or overriding allegiance to the nation-state. The state then disintegrates—as happened in Lebanon—into a chaos of squabbling, feuding, fighting sects, tribes, regions, and parties.”

The late Prof. Alexandre Bennigsen of the Sorbonne, in Paris, was another advocate of the policy, as is his daughter, Marie Bennigsen Broxup, editor of the British quarterly *Central Asian Survey*, who is Britain’s foremost publicist on Dagestan. In his 1985 book *Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union*, Bennigsen proclaimed that “the nearly 50-year-long Caucasian wars [of the nineteenth century] made an important contribution to the material and moral ruin of the Czarist empire and hastened the downfall of the Romanov monarchy.”

Writing of the coming collapse of the Soviet Union in 1985, Bennigsen underscored the Islamic insurgency as the most potent weapon against Moscow: “In the particular case of the North Caucasus, Sufi orders have gained control not only over fundamentalist trends but also over all national resistance movements from the later eighteenth century to the present day. The Chechen-Ingush territory and Dagestan, was among the last Muslim territories to which the Sufi brotherhoods gained access, but once established there, Sufism played a prominent role. Today this territory is probably the one where organized mystic movements are the most dynamic and active in the entire Muslim world.”

By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Bennigsen’s “analysis” had become standard fare among the boosters of various secessionist movements in the Caucasus. Typical is the writings of the Minority Rights Group of Britain, chaired by Sir John Thomson, the former deputy director of MI5 intelligence agency, which, in a report on the region, exulted that “many of the aspirations of the peoples of the region are contradictory and several forces play one group against the other. . . . The North Caucasus is probably the one region in Europe with the highest potential for long-term conflict.”

The Turkish expendables

Today, there are several intersecting, Western-steered Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic organizations that are known to be directly involved in the Caucasus and Central Asia. One is the Gray Wolves, which had been founded and led by Gen. Alparslan Türkeş. The Gray Wolves’ electoral arm, the Na-

tional Action Party, is currently a coalition partner of the ruling government of Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit.

Another is the Pan-Islamic network tied to the Virtue Party (the former Welfare Party), created by former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The third is the far-flung Nursi Sufi order run by Fethullah Gülen, now a fugitive in the United States.

Regarding the Pan-Turks: Although Atatürk had crushed the Pan-Turkic, Pan-Islamic, and Sufi movements in the 1920s, German intelligence was keen for their revival during World War II, as a flank against Russia. That was when Gray Wolves’ supremo Capt. Alparslan Türkeş first came into prominence; he was jailed on charges of being a provocateur, after leading protests demanding that Turkey enter the war on Germany’s side.

After the war, Türkeş’s network was picked up by NATO, which hoped to utilize Turkey, the only NATO member bordering the Soviet Union, as a base for running insurgencies in the Soviet southern tier. Türkeş’s career rapidly advanced through such foreign patronage, and Pan-Turkic liberation networks proliferated. Although Türkeş fled Turkey after the military coup of 1960 (the coup leaders sought his arrest), he returned in 1963 to enter politics. His National Action Party became the parliamentary vehicle for his movement ever since.

Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, NATO began deploying the Gray Wolves into Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, as well as Iran and Bosnia. The Gray Wolves began operating in Azerbaijan in 1992, after Abulfaz Elchibey's Azeri Popular Front came to power. Elchibey named Iskender Gamidov, head of the Azeri branch of the Gray Wolves, as his Interior Minister. Turkish national Gray Wolves flooded into Azerbaijan, where they were used to fight Armenia. The group was also deployed throughout former Soviet Central Asia, with its zealots even calling for spreading Pan-Turkic insurgency into China as well.

Another primary element used to promote an Ottoman revival has been foreign-steered factions within the Welfare Party (now the Virtue Party), formerly led by Prof. Necmettin Erbakan, son of an Ottoman cleric and a member of the Naqsh-bandi Sufi order. The party, which puts itself forward as Pan-Islamic, won the highest plurality of votes in the December 1995 election and came to power in 1996. Erbakan's understanding of Pan-Islamism was best embodied in the economic alliance of eight Islamic nations in the developing sector, known as the D-8. Under his premiership, the D-8 was launched, as were important economic infrastructure agreements with Turkmenistan and Iran. Because of these policies, Erbakan was toppled from power later that year.

While Erbakan, an engineer and economist, focussed on economic cooperation with Islamic partners, this is not the case for all the diverse factions within the party, including that of his rival and would-be heir, former Istanbul Mayor Tayyip Erdogan, who has advocated creating "Islamic-liberated" states stretching from the Caucasus all the way to western China. In 1998, the U.S. State Department issued an official protest when a Turkish court imprisoned Erdogan for stating that "the minarets are our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the mosques our barracks."

Another foreign-steered neo-Ottoman throwaway capability is the Turkish-based Nursi Sufi order led by Fethullah Gulen, which enjoys close ties with the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon and its Washington, D.C. organ, the *Washington Times*. The group has built and staffed religious schools throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia, which it has used as a base for subversion.

That the movement is not all that popular among the Turkish elites is shown by a Turkish National Security Council report leaked in July 1999, following Uzbekistan government charges that Gulen was implicated in the February 1999 attempted assassination of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov. While the accuracy of the Uzbekistan accusations has not been confirmed, the charges have caused a crisis in Uzbekistan-Turkish relations. Gulen fled to the United States in 1997 after the Turkish National Security Council charged his group with attempting to infiltrate the police and army, in order to stage an "Islamic revolution." Pointing to sources outside of Turkey as those responsible for the Uzbekistan destabilization, the leaked report states that Gulen "was able

to obtain [U.S.] diplomatic status and red and green [diplomatic] passports for the 70 teachers he sent to Uzbekistan, under the aegis of the 'U.S. Friendship Bridge.' "

Afghanistan chaos threatens all of Asia

by Ramtanu Maitra

The experiment, which began under the tutelage of Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1980, following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Red Army, to unleash the British-authored geopolitical strategy of violent, anti-Western "Islamic fundamentalism," has now begun to bear its rotten fruit. The criminal elements who were emptied out of the prisons of Islamic countries, and sent to Afghanistan to carry out *jihad* against the Soviet Army, have been organized anew and fresh recruits are being brought in every day.

Unlike the well-heeled retired personnel from Britain's Special Air Services (SAS), who wreak havoc in Africa on behalf of the British mining companies, these new groups are rag-tag mercenaries who are now spreading their militancy radially outward from Afghanistan. From Afghanistan, they have fanned out to fuel unrest and to extend their drug-trafficking network into Pakistan and Kashmir in the east; Dagestan and Chechnya in the northwest; five Central Asian nations in the north and west; and Xinjiang province of China in the northeast. This great and dirty game depends heavily on illegal trade in drugs and guns for financing. These components have flourished very well in the area and beyond, and, although strenuous efforts are being mounted by the governments of the affected nations, there is no guarantee of their immediate success.

The present Afghan situation remains as murky as ever. What is becoming increasingly evident is that peace there cannot come through any magic formula, and the groups with a vested interest in keeping Afghanistan unstable have gained strength over the years. It is also notable, that the Afghan mujahideen, or "Afghansis," who provide muscle to the Taliban, are spreading out, with a definite mission to create chaos on behalf of others. They claim that their mission is to "spread Islam," but there are only a few Islamic governments that would give credence to this absurd claim. Saudi money has provided a cover to the terrorists who, dressed in the white robes of Wahhabis, carry the Holy Koran and preach the orthodox Islam of the Wahhabis.

The Taliban (*Talib* means student in Arabic) were created in 1994. On the ground, the trainers were Pakistani mullahs and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In the Islamic schools—the *madrassahs*—in the areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, Maulana Samiul Haq and Mau-