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What is change?

It is most useful to consider an apparent anomaly at this point. The anomaly is: *the action which results in no action*.

Again, let us reference *In Defense of Common Sense*. Let us take any of the axiomatic systems of hereditary principles *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, *E*, and so forth, respectively. To any among these, if we supply any action to be interpreted by, say, hereditary axiomatic system *A*, there will be no theorem generated by that action which is not consistent with the axiomatics of *A*, the hereditary principle of *A*. Similarly, for *B*, *C*, *D*, *E*, and *F*.

From the standpoint of *A*, that example, that an anomalous aspect of an event which differs from an acceptable axiom of *A*, or is inconsistent with *A*, will simply be disregarded as an erroneous, non-real occurrence.

In the practice of science, this treatment of anomalous reality appears all the time, or nearly so. People say, "Well,

After the October 1987 crash of the New York stock market, some of LaRouche's political collaborators set up this table on Wall Street. "If the common feature is disaster, then we can forecast disaster. But we cannot forecast in exactly which form the disaster will occur."

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it didn't occur, it couldn't have occurred, because. . . ." It is only when one sees several times, that something anomalous did occur, and instead of rejecting the event because it is not consistent with the hereditary principle, one might, rather, realize that the hereditary principle is flawed, by virtue of the recurrence of the anomalous event.

One tests this, very simply, by proving that the alternative system, the alternative axiomatic system, generated by accepting the actuality of the anomalous event, generates a network of theorems which is consistent with the physical evidence, more consistent than the replaced or superseded axiomatic system *A*.

So, in the first instance, when we reject the aspect of the event which cannot be rendered consistent, we have *no-change:* We have no acknowledged result.

There is another aspect to this, a higher form of no-change, or *change that is no-change, but is also change*.

Take the same array, *A, B, C, D, E:* The event that causes the scientist to generate *B* as a successor to *A*, is of a very precise form. That is, even though there is no point of consistency between *A* and *B*, we can define the inconsistency. We can define this geometrically; we can provide a locus definition, which gives us an adumbrated algebraic definition, and so forth and so on. So, no event but one which is consistent with that difference will carry us from *A* to *B*, that is, will generate *B* out of *A*. Anything inconsistent with that inconsistency, would either lead not to *B*, or, if it is required to lead to *B*, will tend to be ignored. If the latter is not ignored, it will lead toward a completely different axiomatic system, which then comes under the same test.

Now, let us apply this principle to political and social processes and events.

We have this all the time; we have these kinds of envelopes all the time. Within limits, once something that can be represented as axiomatically determined in the course of events in process, any event, within certain bounds, introduced as a novel event to that system, will lead to the same general result as any other such event. It makes no difference what the choices are *within those bounds*. We will still end up with the same general outcome.

Now, for example, let us take simple economic forecasting. In the recent period, at every point we were forecasting, looking ahead, someone said to us, "When is this going to happen?" In response to that query, we could list an array of events which will be the probable, mutually exclusive alternatives.

Now, in each of these cases, the event is a crisis, which takes different forms; but all of the forms add up generally, within certain limits, to the same result, even though they are different in detail.

It is one of the difficulties of forecasting, that it is more difficult to cause the layman, even the informed layman, to understand such a forecast and its significance, than it is to construct such a forecast (at least for me, an old hand at this sort of thing).

They rebuke me, "But that is no forecast. Which of those is it?"

I say, "It could be any number of them. But they all add up to the same thing." And whatever that is, when it happens, will cause another series of complementary events, which, whichever route is taken in detail, will add up to the same general thing in turn.

So, for the most part, we have systems which don't change. They change, but they don't change. And even the change may change, but without changing. *What we can forecast is that which does not change, the invariant, common feature of a variety of alternative sequelae*. That common feature is forecastable. If the common feature is disaster, then we can forecast disaster. But we cannot forecast in exactly which form the disaster will occur, because we don't know, in advance, which of the alternative routes will be taken, willfully. But once we forecast the disaster, we can examine the disaster, in all aspects, and find how the characteristic, which is disaster, will determine a characteristic sequel.

We can determine also something else, which takes us to *how to change the no-change*.

By looking at that which must be done to get us out of this kind of limitation, these kinds of boundaries, this trap, we select a course of action which takes us into new dimensions, which changes the characteristic of the event. Either we wish the disaster, in which case we don't try to change that sequence; or we don't wish that latter outcome, that characteristic; in which latter case, we must select only events available to us which will cause a different characteristic to emerge.

So, then we have the boundary conditions within which certain events lie. These events mean, effectively, no-change which is of one order or another. Any of these events are somewhat interchangeable; not entirely, but somewhat, at least in terms of that general thing which may be most significant to us in the result.

But there are also events which lie outside that narrow domain, outside these more restricted bounds, which can produce a different common characteristic of an alternative set of events, than the first case. That is the way we have to look at not only political processes, but, that is the way in which we have to look at physical processes.