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## Documentation

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### The eight-point declaration

The historic German-Soviet agreement that will end Soviet military occupation of German territory before the end of 1994 was contained in an eight-point declaration read out by Chancellor Kohl at a joint press conference with Soviet President Gorbachov in Zheleznovodsk on July 16. The eight points are:

1) Unification is confined to the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and Berlin.

2) At the moment German unification is completed, all four Power responsibilities and powers will be completely terminated.

3) A reunited Germany will have full and unlimited sovereignty to freely and independently decide which alliance, if any, it desires to be a member of. Kohl added that united Germany will become a member of NATO; that is the view of his government and of the G.D.R. government of De Maiziere.

4) United Germany will conclude a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the former G.D.R. The Soviet troop withdrawal is to be completed within three to four years.

5) There will be no extension of NATO structures during the time of the Soviet withdrawal onto the territory of the former G.D.R. Territorial units of the German armed forces not under NATO jurisdiction, will be stationed on former G.D.R. territory. After the Soviet withdrawal, Germany may station German units of NATO on formerly East German territory, but no foreign troops. No weaponry that has a nuclear capability, i.e., delivery systems, will be allowed on the former territory of the G.D.R.

6) The troops of the Western Allies and Soviet units may remain in Berlin during the time of the Soviet withdrawal. Force levels could be reduced, but not raised above current levels. After the Soviet withdrawal is completed, Germany will negotiate with the Western Allies for the withdrawal of their Berlin garrisons.

7) The German armed forces will be reduced to a ceiling of 370,000 by the completion of the Soviet withdrawal. Reductions in German troop strength will begin with the signing of a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

8) United Germany will renounce the manufacture and possession of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and will subscribe to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

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## Background to the News

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### The new political parties in Russia

by Rachel Douglas

Hardly anybody expressed the political weakness of the no-longer-ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union better than ideology chief Vadim Medvedev, at its 28th Congress at the beginning of July. Accused from the floor of having surrendered Marxist-Leninist ideological values, Medvedev sniffed, "What kind of ideology was it, if one person managed to ruin it in such a short period of time?"

As the CPSU writhes in its death throes, new political parties have burgeoned, since their creation was legalized earlier this year. The following survey identifies the major new parties and what they stand for, in which the most striking common feature is the utter lack of an economic program apart from confused notions about a "free market" or "privatization." There is a positive aspect to this. In view of the demise of the free market ideologues (see LaRouche's comments, p. 6), this lack of a policy means that Russia is a blank slate where a workable policy, such as that now being introduced through Helmut Kohl as the spokesman for a soon-to-be united Germany, has a real chance of taking hold.

This report concentrates on Russia-based parties. In the other republics, the captive nations that are at various stages of claiming their independence from Moscow, new parties double as powerful independence movements, like Rukh in Ukraine or Lithuania's Sajudis.

#### Democratic Platform

A draft "Democratic Platform" for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was printed in *Pravda* this past spring. Its main innovation was to reject the "democratic centralism" that always required Bolsheviks to toe the party line. On April 10, the CPSU Central Committee issued an open letter against Democratic Platform, which asked how those who denounced the CPSU could stay within it. Some of the adherents of Democratic Platform exited the CPSU at that point, others later, during the 28th Congress.

There were indications in *Pravda* that the CPSU apparat feared huge recruitment by Democratic Platform from the party ranks. Although the apparat-dominated delegate selec-

tion process led to drastic under-representation of Democratic Platform at the founding conference of the Communist Party of Russia, in June, and again the next month at the 28th Congress of the CPSU, Democratic Platform claims the support of 2.5 million CPSU members, or approximately 10% of the party's rapidly shrinking membership. As the 28th Congress came to the end of its second week, on July 12 and 13 numerous Democratic Platform leaders made their break with the CPSU. They will now be free to join other parties, such as the Democratic Party of Russia, or found new ones.

## The Democratic Party

In the March 4 elections in the Russian Republic, Ukraine, and Belorussia, the Democratic Russia slate and related slates triumphed in Moscow (new mayor: Gavriil Popov), Leningrad (new mayor: Anatoli Sobchak), and other cities. As of late April, according to *New Times*, most of the members of the Democratic Russia bloc of deputies in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, including Popov and Sobchak, were still members of the CPSU. But not for long.

When the Central Committee Open Letter against Democratic Platform appeared on April 10, Igor Chubais declared that a bureaucratic coup had occurred in the CPSU, and he urged the formation of a new party. "We call on all Communists to leave the party, to stop paying dues and join the new party of the Democratic Platform," said Chubais at that time.

During May, Chubais, activists from the Democratic Russia slates, and other ex-CPSU members like chess master Garry Kasparov, formed the new Democratic Party of Russia (DPR). Besides Kasparov, its leading lights include U.S.S.R. People's Deputy Nikolai Travkin, and former adherents of Democratic Platform like Chubais. It has input and support also from those in the Congress of People's Deputies who joined the Interregional Group, founded by the late Academician Andrei Sakharov.

The organizing committee of the DPR was headed by Travkin, who told a May 7 press conference, reported in *Izvestia* two days later, that its goals would be struggle against totalitarianism, the sovereignty of the people in Russia, and creation of "a sovereign, democratic, and economically strong Russian Federation." Travkin said he had held talks with the organizing committee of the Peasant Party, which would join DPR as a *fraktsiya*, or sanctioned faction. Similar talks were being held with Free Labor, a party of the cooperative movement, he added, as well as with independent labor leaders and the writers' group called April.

Georgi Khatsenkov, a CC CPSU staffer who quit the Communist Party and is the DPR's deputy organizing chairman, told Reuters in May, "We think that by October we'll be in a position to rival the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . . We want to return Russia to the civilized community of nations with rights for individual freedom and freedom of enterprise. Our first aim is to get rid of the CPSU,

but we don't want a civil war."

Kasparov told the London *Observer* that the party would campaign for "democracy" and a "market economy." He elaborated, "Essentially, we seek political stability through economic freedom. We must privatize the economy and use some of the money to set up a social security system and keep taxes down for those who will suffer from the changes."

Those ideas of social justice, echoing Sakharov, are more pronounced in Kasparov's public statements than is his vague talk about "market economy." All of these political activists are aware of the grim results in Poland, where the IMF's "shock therapy" was applied in the name of a free market. Again, during the founding conference of DPR on May 28, Kasparov warned, "We must soften the economic transition or people won't survive." But the party lacks a concept of economic development that would achieve this goal.

DPR also promptly linked itself to the politicization of Soviet coal miners who struck last summer, calling on them to strike again, as a protest against the large price increases announced by the Soviet government.

## The rebel mayors

In Moscow, Popov and the other officials elected on the Democratic Russia slate command widespread and fervent support. Among them are people who were never in the CPSU—activists like the disabled persons' rights advocate Ilya Zaslavsky, and associates of Sakharov. It is in Moscow, that the popular scorn for Communist dictatorship has been trumpeted for the whole world to hear. First there was the landslide election of Boris Yeltsin to the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989, when he was in disgrace within the CPSU. Then came the outpouring of the public to Sakharov's funeral. In February 1990, hundreds of thousands of Muscovites demonstrated for democracy; the Army's Taman Division went on alert in response. On May 1, the CPSU Politburo was booed off the podium in Red Square, by throngs of demonstrators against Communist dictatorship. And as the 28th Congress drew to a close, again more than 100,000 people came out in Red Square under banners like "Down with the Red Fascists."

Zaslavsky, as a member of the Moscow city government, has forced the issue of the CPSU's material property. In his Oktyabrsky Rayon district of Moscow, he recently took possession, in the name of the local government, of a fairly new apartment building built for the Communist Party elite, which will now be inhabited by ordinary families. In Leningrad, where Sobchak's non-communist elected municipal government is at loggerheads with the Communist Party machine headed by Boris Gidasov, the city government froze 50 recent sales of property, including the sale of a big Communist Party country estate to an environmentalist organization nobody had ever heard of before, in order to foil Communist attempts to hide property of which they might be divested. In both cities, battles are raging for control of each

TV channel, each newspaper.

Sobchak told *Moscow News* June 10, "There will be no dual power," i.e. sharing of power between the Communist Party and the elected government. "Even now we can speak about the *soviets*' [councils] absolute power, even if it is seasoned with remnants of the past."

What do the popular mayors stand for? Several bold initiatives, such as Sobchak's offer to barter Leningrad machinery for Lithuanian meat and milk, have challenged Soviet imperial power plays, but where they are weakest is the most important point: the content of the economic reform they advocate. Sobchak is a lawyer, and his economics advisers are orienting to the worst "free market" models. Pyotr Filipov, an economist and member of the Leningrad City Soviet, proudly related to *New York Times* reporter Bill Keller, how he and Sobchak had refused as "socialist slavery," the region's collective farms' demand for forced "volunteers" from the city to weed vegetable crops. But when asked what positive policy he stood for, Filipov replied, "I agree with those who say we must hurry quickly away from Marxism-Leninism, through Socialism, to Reaganism."

Sobchak, in fact, wants to make Leningrad a "free economic zone," a haven for foreign investment. City-run cafeterias, barbershops, hotels, would be sold. Interviewed by the Soviet weekly *New Times* for its May 29 issue, Sobchak said he thought Leningrad businesses could make tons of money if the city became a major tourist attraction.

In his *Moscow News* interview of June 10, Sobchak outlined the goals of his new "Leningrad Revolution" as "new administrative bodies and . . . a concept for renewing every sphere of municipal authority. We suggest securing the status of a free economic zone," modeled on the law passed by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet last year on Baltic states' economic sovereignty. "The key element in it for us is the transfer of enterprises from the embrace of government departments and ministries, onto a citywide, horizontal level." New, "young, industrious and competent people," must be brought in to replace the old guard.

## The question of Boris Yeltsin

On July 12, Gavriil Popov and Anatoli Sobchak walked out of the 28th Congress of the CPSU, and resigned their party memberships. So did Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the former CPSU Politburo member, now President of the Russian Republic.

Yeltsin has made his mark as the embodiment of "democratization"—the ousted Communist functionary who came back as a man of the people. He linked up with the Interregional Group, of Sakharov, in the Congress of People's Deputies. Most recently, he picked



up the banner of "sovereignty" for the Russian Republic, which was declared by its Supreme Soviet on June 12, at the same conference that chose Yeltsin President after prolonged battles. (See *EIR* June 15, "Who's afraid of Boris Nikolayevich?" and July 6, "Five non-Russian republics declare their sovereignty".)

Rarely has Yeltsin pinned himself to a political, not to mention an economic, program. But, during the debates at the June conference of the Communist Party of Russia, Yeltsin-supporter and Interregional Group leader Mikhail Bocharov, who was running for chairman of that new party section, outlined what he said was President Yeltsin's 500-day plan for the newly "sovereign" Russian economy. It would comprise four phases: preparation, privatization, introduction of a market, and stabilization. The first would be a 100-day period of publicizing the plan, taking inventory, and warning economic enterprises that their subsidies were about to be terminated. During the five-month second phase, Bocharov said, the equivalent of \$320 billion worth of government-owned industry would be sold off through share issues and other means. In the next period, to create a "market," prices would be decontrolled; heavy industry production would be expected to plummet. The last 100 days would entail targeted government investment to resolve remaining "structural problems," and the reduction of prices on consumer goods.

If this sounds like a fairy tale, it is not the only mythic glow emanating from Boris Yeltsin. He has the earmarks of a classic figure in Russian history—the pretender to the throne, who emerges during a period of turmoil. His antecedents were the False Dmitri of the Time of Troubles (1598-1613), and the Cossack fighter Pugachov, who led a rebellion against Catherine the Great in 1773. Such a person would be politically patronized by powerful interests from inside the empire or abroad, as Dmitri was by Polish interests or Pugachov by the Old Believer sect, but would be seen by the peasant population as czar-savior, champion of the people, and become the rallying point for armed rebellions and wars. So Yeltsin is the candidate of the "democratic" intelligentsia, Sakharov's supporters, but at the same time he is a hero of the people, the *narod*. Soviet newspapers have reported it said among the people, that "in Sverdlovsk," where Yeltsin used to be Communist Party chief, "under Boris Nikolayevich there was meat." The Russian pretender demonstrates his legitimacy by means of marks, signs, and miracles, as with Pugachov's claim that certain scars that he had showed he was Peter III, the murdered husband of Catherine the Great. With Boris Yeltsin, there was his report of electromagnetic anti-cardiac weapon attacks on him, and the incident of his being fished from the Moscow River, as a result, according to one of his accounts, of an attempted murder. Like Yeltsin, the Cossack Pugachov also appeared as the champion of the nationalities (Bashkirs, Kalmyks) against Moscow.

## Peasant Party?

There may emerge a single new political party of the Russian peasantry, or several as in Poland, or peasant organizations under the hegemony of other political parties. The DPR, as Travkin revealed, made its attempt in this last direction, as did the CPSU. The agricultural paper *Selskaya Zhizn* reported March 9, that during the Third U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies, representatives from the agrarian sector met separately. In discussion of the government's failure to "deliver the goods" to the sector, "the question was raised: The peasantry should seek an equal position in society." Deputy A.F. Veprev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Agrarian Questions and Food, "suggested . . . that they discuss the idea of creating a peasant labor party." Others preferred, instead, "a nonpolitical organization—a peasants' labor union," but Veprev insisted that only in a peasant party's "struggle for power" could peasant interests be upheld.

On June 11-13, the founding conference of a national Peasants Union took place in Moscow. U.S.S.R. People's Deputy I. Kukhar, one of the organizers of this meeting, told *Izvestia* that this was "not a political party, or even the first step toward the formation of one. The creation of a peasant party is regarded by the congress organizers . . . as premature."

CPSU officials, however, stormed the Peasants Union meeting for their own purposes. Then-Politburo member Yegor Ligachov and others took the occasion to stage a rally for socialism, against the "market economy" as an assault on socialism, for collective farms being equal or superior to private and leasehold farming, and so forth. The daily *Izvestia*, which takes a pro-reform posture, reported sourly on the meeting's selection of V. Starodubtsev, a celebrated successful collective farm leader, as chairman of the new organization. A group of farmers who were unable to speak at this conference, *Izvestia* reported, released a statement that the key to agriculture today would be individual and family peasant labor, and that it would be fine for collective farm leaders to go form their own union, only it would not be the peasant union.

Ligachov did not, however, win support for his proposal that the Peasant Union be attached to the CPSU. Especially with the CPSU's weakened condition manifest at its 28th Congress, the political allegiance of the Peasants Union is still up for grabs.

## Other parties

The spectrum of other, smaller, new parties embraces many that are really old parties, replicating the political motley of the Duma (Russian parliament) in the early twentieth century. Other parties map themselves onto political categories that are common in Western Europe.

**Social Democrats.** TASS reported May 4 that 247 delegates attended the inaugural congress of the R.S.F.S.R.'s

Social Democratic Party (SDP), organized by Oleg Rumyantsev and others. Its May 5 declaration of principles states that the Social Democratic Party of Russia is "a parliamentary party," advocating respect for law, individual rights, removing ideology from the state and education, and a plurality of forms of economic ownership. The question of whether local organizations of the SDP would have the right to disagree with central policies and not implement them, or if there would be "strict principles of democratic centralism," was the subject of fierce debate, which mirrored the 1903 split of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks.

**Constitutional Democrats.** On May 20, the Soviet TV news show *Vremya* reported on the founding congress of the Party of Constitutional Democrats, continuing the traditions of the Kadet party before the Revolution. Organizing committee member Igor M. Surikov said the new Kadets would advocate "private ownership," "free enterprise," and no censorship.

**Christian Democrats.** The Russian Christian Democratic Movement held its constituent congress in Moscow in April, according to TASS. This political party aims to convoke an all-Russia council, which would be "called upon to restore 'the interrupted continuity of legal supreme power in Russia.'" One founding member was Vyacheslav Polosin, dean of Borisoglebsk Church in Obninsk, according to whom a Christian Democrats' group was already set up in the new Russian Supreme Soviet.

As *EIR* has reported from a June issue of *Moscow News*, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement defines its principles as "responsible anti-communism, Christian spirituality, and enlightened patriotism." The party counts at least 15,000 members, most of them concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad.

**Monarchists.** On May 19, *Vremya* reported on the First All-Russian Monarchist Congress, which founded the Orthodox Monarchist Order Union, known by its Russian acronym, PRAMOS. Here, too, there was an Orthodox Church tie-in, as the event was held on the grounds of the Donskoi Monastery. PRAMOS marshal S.V. Yurkov-Engelgardt, believed to be a descendent of the Baltic German Engelhardt family that was powerful under Czar Aleksandr I in the early nineteenth century, told *Vremya* that PRAMOS "calls for the country to return to monarchy as a uniting principle, for land reform whose aim is to hand the working of the land to the peasants as their own property, with the right to hired labor on that land." It also stresses the restoration of abolished military ranks, and the strengthening of the Army and Navy, to protect "a non-socialist state, but [preserving] the integrity and indivisibility of the Orthodox fatherland." Yurkov-Engelgardt said that PRAMOS recognizes Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich Romanov as sovereign, and that while "there is nothing national and political [in the party's activity], there is something Orthodox, since the members of our party must be Orthodox believers."