

## As Britain predicted...

*Some three to six months ago, the leading policy-makers of the British oligarchy wrote the scenarios predicting what is now happening in the U.S. capital. Here are two samples.*

### **The RIIA assesses Carter's presidency**

*The following is the British monarchy's assessment of the first two years of the Carter presidency as it appeared in the February 1979 edition of The World Today, a Chatham House publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Titled "Carter's dilemmas: presidential power and its limits," the article appears to balance Carter's faults against his good points. The scales, however, are weighted. Their conclusion is that Carter is a weak, indecisive and incompetent President—a sentiment now being echoed by the U.S. and British press, among others.*

Until recently, the presidency of Jimmy Carter gave the appearance of a President without power. Elected with great hopes and even greater expectations of his own, Carter initially looked incapable of carrying through his political programme. ... The ominous phrase "one-term President" began to be heard....

Then came Camp David. The unexpected success of Carter's summit mediation between Israel and Egypt almost overnight invested him with the aura of a powerful President....

The power of the President ... is "the power to persuade."... He must, if he is to be effective in office, persuade his constitutional competitors for power, day by day, of the necessity and appropriateness of his policies....

The task of the President in this process is made considerably more difficult if developments outside his control confront him with the dilemmas from which he cannot escape without losing his powers of persuasion. This is precisely what happened to President Carter

### **The President**

The first dilemma facing the President was to have been elected on a promise of a clean sweep in Washington, yet to have to depend on the existing Washington set-up to bring about a new regime. Only a strong President

could have overcome the resulting difficulties....

The problems went deeper than the President's life-style and the latitude enjoyed by his staff. Soon Carter's working style was at issue. Here, too, he faced a genuine dilemma. ... Carter could not, nor did he want to, install a similar regime (the "imperial presidency" of his predecessors—ed.). Openness and individual responsibility were to be hallmarks of his administration.

As a consequence, there was at first no central coordination of staff work in the White House which appeared inefficient and incompetent....

Now Carter was facing the dilemma of once again having to coordinate, in the interest of efficiency, the work of his administration in the White House, but thereby risking charges of acting like an imperial president.

... The American voters in 1976 did not want politics as usual, but rather a new politics, both in substance and in procedure. Carter could ill afford to act like a traditional politician. The few times he tried it, albeit rather clumsily, he was mercilessly ridiculed and his dilemma ruthlessly exploited. ... Such incidences contributed to the image of a weak, indecisive and indeed bamboozled President. ...

### **Public opinion**

The final word about the success or failure of this administration will be the American public's, and not only in the primary elections of 1980....

The main complaint of the American public about Carter was that he was not tough enough, with regard to both domestic problems and foreign adversaries....

Toughness is now being demanded above all in regard to pressing economic problems. ... It had always been a characteristic—and confusing—element of Carter's basic political appeal that he is a liberal in terms of social problems, but a conservative in regard to economic ones....

The overriding issue in the near future will be whether Carter will succeed in providing more for less. Should this prove to be impossible ... he may yet encounter his biggest dilemma....

In the course of the past two years, Carter has tenaciously extracted himself from many of his major dilemmas, some of which he had helped create. One of his biggest problems was that of timing. ... But now Carter finally can look ahead to some plain sailing....

## Ditchley: 'U.S. power on the wane'

In December 1978, the Ditchley Foundation held a Conference on Europe and the West, taking stock of the role Europe must play in the face of "the relative decline of the U.S.," as the conference report puts it. The conference and its report, published in the spring 1979 issue of the Ditchley Journal, are no mere academic exercises. The foundation, on the British side, counts among its members the leading policy-makers of the oligarchy and thus, their deliberations portend strategies and policies implemented in the not-too-distant future.

U.S. Ditchley, according to its constitutional statement, was established to pursue the strategic policy goals of British Ditchley. On the membership roster is Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Rita Hauser, a member of the New York Council on Foreign Relations and a close advisor of presidential candidate John Connally, Paul Volker, recently nominated to head the Federal Reserve, and George Franklin of the Trilateral Commission, which is the institutional core of the Carter administration.

The following excerpts are from the conference report, titled "Europe and the West: Institutions and Organizations," by Robert Jackson.

The conference was perhaps most useful in clarifying ideas about institutionalization in Community and international (especially transatlantic) relations. To put the question in its most general terms: given that the world, the West and the Community in particular are facing new problems of unprecedented scope in the management of international relations, how much positive institution-building is required to secure the required degree of management?...

The fundamental concept here is that of *management*, the contention being that the issues arising in international affairs may increasingly be regarded as management problems....

Broadly, there seem to be three main management models on offer: *hegemony, cooperation, or institutionalization*.

Under the *hegemony model*, a single state possesses the strength to project its influence over other territories, so that a zone of management is established within which the decisions of that state govern a wider system. In the past century the various colonial empires are examples of the hegemony model. So are Hitler's "New Order" in Europe, the present Soviet system, and, after

a fashion, the recent postwar American leadership of the "Free World."...

The *cooperation model* consists of a free partnership between distinct sovereign states ... coming together to manage the transnational dimension of their affairs....

The *institutionalization model* ... is characterized by obligation....

The debates at the conference thus added up, it seems to me, to an exploration of the new phenomena which are appearing in international space, and which are beginning to call into question our established orthodoxies.

Most fundamental, there has been the relative decline of the U.S.—the hegemonic power around which the Western system was organized in the postwar era. Although American military preponderance within the West remains intact, the balance of economic power has shifted and, more fundamentally, the American will to lead has slackened. The West was until recently like a single solar system: now it is a constellation with at least three suns—the United States, Germany and Japan (with France rising fast and continuing to exercise a moral ascendancy over Germany). The Western system can no longer be managed by an extension of American decisions: it has to be managed—at least in the economic and financial sphere—on the basis of a more or less equal partnership.

... Outside of government, in the financial and commercial marketplace, the logic of rationalization, concentration and the deployment of capital and technology has driven across established boundaries and brought into being new forms of transnational organization....

The new power centers are, moreover, not confined to the Western world. The growth of the dependence of the industrialized countries upon the oil producers has brought new problems of transnational management....

Similarly, the rise of Soviet power has introduced new problems of transnational management....

These new phenomena—the relative decline of the U.S.; the ascendancy of the transnational market place and its private institutions; the growth of new power centers in the developing world; and the rise of Soviet power—have introduced a host of novel and complex phenomena into the international order. ... The question is: will these redoubled efforts at international management on the old basis prove adequate? Or will we find, as the task and problems continue to mount, that the "cooperation model" is no longer up to the job, and that some new system ... is required?